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UNEMPLOYMENT WITHOUT FAULT: DISQUALIFI-
CATIONS FOR UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE BENEFITS
DAVID R. PACKARDt
I. INTRODUCTION
EVERY STATE has enacted comprehensive unemployment in-
surance benefit programs covering almost every sector of the
labor force.' Enacted in 1935 as part of the Social Security Act, these
programs now play a vital role in maintaining the economic security of
American workers. Unemployment compensation in the United States
is a federally aided, state administered insurance program2 which relies
heavily on employer contributions.' While many aspects of unemploy-
ment insurance benefits vary from state to state,4 the heart of the
t A.B., University of California at Berkeley, 1964; J.D., 1967. Member of
the California and Maryland Bars.
1. Gradually, unemployment insurance programs have been expanded to cover
additional classes of employees. The federal enabling legislation, Title III of the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 501 to 503 (1970), excluded all farm workers,
domestic workers, self-employed persons, employees of non-profit organizations and
casual employees of an employer or employing unit with less than eight workers.
Coverage now typically includes some classes of agricultural workers, seasonal labor
and employees of non-profit entities, regardless of the size of the unit. See generally
T. BRODEN, LAW OF SOCIAL SECURITY AND UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 1-18 (1962).
See also Witte, Development of Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE L.J. 21
(1945). Elective coverage provisions in the various statutes allow for inclusion of
otherwise excluded employees. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 701 et seq. (West
Supp. 1971).
2. Assistance to eligible states, in the form of administrative grants, is author-
ized by section 302 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 502 (1970). State
statutes expressly provide for receipt of federal grants and conform to all mandatory
federal requirements. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 451 (West 1956) ; MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 17.511 (1968); N.Y. LABOR LAW § 536 (McKinney 1965) ; PA. STAT.
tit. 43, § 767 (1964). Federal grant requirements concern the procedural or admin-
istrative aspects of state programs rather than their substantive parts. Eligibility
conditions and disqualifications for benefits derive solely from state law.
3. Employer contributions are computed on the basis of a complex formula,
taking into account, among other factors, the size of the work force and its
"experience rating" or actuarial risk. Ineligible unemployment claimants are not
counted against the employer in determining his experience rating. Since unemploy-
ment insurance taxes are a cost of doing business, the employer has a financial
interest in contesting claims. See generally Arnold, Experience Rating, 55 YALE L.J.
218 (1945). Originally, the employee contributed to the insurance system by means
of a wage deduction, but this feature has been eliminated. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP.
INS. CODE § 976 (West Supp. 1971).
4. The amount and duration of benefits vary greatly from state to state. See
generally T. BRODEN, supra note 1, at 312. According to Professor Broden, these
differences cannot be explained in terms of cost of living or wage scale variances.
They may, however, represent a state's unwillingness to risk losing industry by
imposing on employers the additional taxes necessary to support increased benefits.
Another variable among jurisdictions is the extent and duration of suspending
unemployment benefits due to disqualification. Some states merely impose various
waiting periods while others cancel all accrued benefits. See Kempfer, Disqualifications
for Voluntary Leaving and Misconduct, 55 YALE L.J. 147 (1945).
(635)
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unemployment compensation system, and the rationale for its eligibility
conditions, is that the worker must be unemployed through no fault of
his own.5 The concept of involuntary unemployment is an elusive one;
the most common issues in the day to day administration and appeals
of unemployment insurance claims involve eligibility conditions which
are based on that concept. Those eligibility conditions involve: (1)
whether the employee was discharged for willful misconduct; (2)
whether the employee voluntarily quit his last employment without
good cause; and (3) whether he is able and available for employment
during the period of compensation. These eligibility conditions are
found in some form in every state statutory program for unemploy-
ment insurance benefits.' The primary aid of unemployment insur-
ance programs is almost universally accepted. It is succinctly put in a
leading Pennsylvania case:
This is a statute enacted to provide for the common good in an
attempt to provide economic security for a time, through referred
jobs in productive industry for the unemployed, without the stigma
of poor relief, as a substitute for the dole or made-work. Its pur-
pose is to prevent indigence due to involuntary unemployment
through no fault of the employee.'
In this sense, unemployment insurance cannot be viewed in isolation,
but must be seen as a part of a broader spectrum of social legislation,
including workman's compensation, social security, public assistance
and state disability insurance.' Benefits once granted are generally
exempt from execution or attachment, apparently to effectuate the
5. Every state has enacted an unemployment insurance program that incorporates
in some form the phrase "unemployed through no fault of his own." See, e.g., CAL.
UNEMP. INS. CODE § 100 (West 1956); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.531 (Supp. 1971);
N.Y. LABOR LAW § 501 (McKinney 1965) ; PA. STAT. tit. 43, § 752 (1964).
6. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 1256, 1257 (West Supp. 1971) ; MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 17.531 (1968); N.Y. LABOR LAW § 593 (McKinney 1965); PA. STAT.
tit. 43, § 802 (1964).
7. Barclay White Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 356 Pa. 43, 51, 50 A.2d 336,
341, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947), quoting Seifing Unemp. Comp. Case, 159 Pa.
Super. 94, 107-08, 46 A.2d 598, 739 (1946) (dissenting opinion). See also Portland
Cement Co. v. Unemployment Ins. App. Bd., 178 Cal. App. 2d 263, 3 Cal. Rptr. 37
(1960).
Additional objectives of unemployment compensation include: (1) encourag-
ing full and stable employment by means of financial incentives to employers, Bliley
Elec. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 158 Pa. Super. 548, 45 A.2d 898 (1946);
(2) promoting conciliation and harmony in industrial labor relations, Douglas Aircraft
Co. v. Unemployment Ins. App. Bd., 180 Cal. App. 2d 636, 643-48, 4 Cal. Rptr. 723,
729-31 (1960); and (3) rehabilitating and retraining for employment those un-
employed who do not have or who have lost skills demanded by the labor market,
see, e.g., Human Resources Development Act of 1968, CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 9000
et seq. (West Supp. 1971), which is administered in conjunction with the federal
Manpower Development & Training Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 2571 et seq. (1970).
8. See generally T. BRODEN, supra note 1; Riesenfeld, Workmen's Compensation
and Other Social Legislation: The Shadow of Stone Tablets, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 207
(1965). See pp. 637-38 and accompanying notes infra.
[VOL. 17 : p. 635
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legislative aim of alleviating economic suffering among those involun-
tarily unemployed.9 Given the apparent liberal construction and inter-
pretation of unemployment insurance law - founded in part upon
the purpose of affording economic security to the unemployed ° - it
is surprising that the reported case law and administrative decisions
usually involve cases denying benefits. This may reflect the failure of
administrative agencies and courts to resolve doubtful cases in favor
of the employee. The paradox can also be understood in light of the
administrative procedure applicable to unemployment insurance claims,
which is based upon the premise that unsophisticated and unrepresented
claimants will be able to comprehend and fully present their cases."
In order to administer the unemployment insurance program, state
departments of employment and their various branch offices are given
statutory power and responsibility for the processing and initial deter-
mination of claims. Claim interviewers have the responsibility to
gather all necessary evidence to decide the eligibility of a multitude
of claimants. 2 The task becomes enormous when it is considered that
the goal of alleviating economic hardship depends heavily on prompt,
efficient and accurate administration.'1  Thus, administrative realities
often help to shape the substantive rules of disqualification. For this
9. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 100 (West 1956); N.Y. LABOR LAW§ 595 (McKinney 1965); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4141.32 (Page 1965); PA. STAT.
tit. 43, § 863 (1964).
10. Because the unemployment compensation statute is remedial and aims to
alleviate economic distress due to involuntary unemployment, it should be construed
liberally to achieve these goals. Garcia v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 41 Cal. 2d 689,
693, 263 P.2d 8, 10-11 (1953), cited in Portland Cement Co. v. Unemployment Ins.
App. Bd., 178 Cal. App. 2d 263, 270, 3 Cal. Rptr. 37, 41 (1960). See also Reed v.
Employment Security Comm'n, 364 Mich. 395, 110 N.W.2d 107 (1961); American
Steel & Wire Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 161 Pa. Super. 622, 56 A.2d 288
(1948).
11. The adjudication of benefit claims is not an adversary proceeding. However,
the employer is usually represented by himself, or in his absence, by the department.
The department's duty to investigate and contest doubtful claims, initially or on
appeal, flows from its statutory responsibility to protect the insurance fund from
ineligibles. See Miller v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 359 Mich. 342, 102 N.W.2d 728
(1960); Krause v. A. M. Karaghensian, Inc., 13 N.J. 446, 455, 100 A.2d 277, 286
(1953); Stanley Mfg. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 208 Pa. Super. 291, 222 A.2d
468 (1966).
12. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 1326 to 1328 (West Supp. 1971); N.Y.
LABOR LAW § 597 (McKinney 1965). Following the determination regarding eligi-
bility, the employer and employee receive written notice of the decision, which becomes
final unless a prompt appeal is made in writing requesting a hearing to present evidence
to a referee or examiner. If an employer appeals from a notice upholding the claim,
state statutes often provide for withholding actual payment from the employee until
the referee affirms the award of benefits. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1335(West 1956) ; N.Y. LABOR LAW § 598 (McKinney 1965) ; PA. STAT. tit. 43, § 821
(1964). The enforcement of these provisions is now barred by the recent decision of
the United States Supreme Court in Department of Human Resources v. Java, 402
U.S. 121 (1971), which found them in conflict with the mandatory provisions of
42 U.S.C. § 503(a) (1) (1970) (requiring payment of benefits "when due").
13. Department of Human Resources v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 130-33 (1971).
MARCH- 1972]
3
Packard: Unemployment without Fault: Disqualifications for Unemployment In
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1972
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
reason, procedural law is covered in this article, although the focus
is on substantive law.
The purpose of this article is to analyze the current, major issues
of disqualification on the basis of legislative intent and purposes of
unemployment compensation. The following discussion will center
on the two major areas of ineligibility: (1) voluntary leaving without
good cause; and (2) willful misconduct. In conjunction with both
topics, the concept of "constructive quitting" will also be examined.
The subjects of unemployment arising out of labor disputes and dis-
qualifications for refusal of suitable employment are omitted.14
II. VOLUNTARY LEAVING WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE
An unemployed claimant who voluntarily leaves his last job is in-
eligible for unemployment insurance benefits unless he can establish
that he had good cause for leaving. 5 The threshold question, then,
in deciding the claim is whether the employee left the job or was dis-
charged by the employer. Voluntary leaving and misconduct are com-
plementary sides of the same coin in which the ultimate issue is the
same: whether the employee reasonably could have acted to avoid un-
employment. Logically, no distinction in analysis or result should flow
from the rather difficult process of classification. However, procedural
and substantive rules do differ depending on whether the separation
is classified as a discharge or a quit, and it is often quite difficult to
make such a distinction. For example, the employee who walks off the
job after being berated by the boss and given an ultimatum about his
work can be considered as leaving or being fired, depending upon one's
point of view. The resolution of this initial issue depends upon the
factual circumstances at the time of separation from employment.'
14. Labor disputes and trade dispute disqualifications are covered in the following
articles: Feldman, The Garden of Live Flowers: Terminating the Trade Dispute
Disqualification Under the California Unemployment Insurance Act, 27 So. CALIF. L.
REV. 3 (1953) ; Riesenfeld, supra note 8, at 218-22. Refusal of suitable employment
as a disqualification is discussed in Menard, Refusal of Suitable Work, 55 YALE L.J.
134 (1945) ; Williams, Eligibility for Benefits, 8 VAND. L. REv. 286 (1955).
15. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1256 (West 1956); MIcH. STAT. ANN.
§ 17.531 (1968) ; N.Y. LABOR LAW § 593 (McKinney 1965) ; PA. STAT. tit. 43, § 802
(1964).
16. See, e.g., White v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 200 Pa. Super. 357, 188 A.2d
759 (1963). In this case, the court found that the claimant was fired and did not
quit when he walked off the job after the boss scolded him and said "there is the
door." See also Yellow Cab Co. v. Unemployment Ins. App. Bd., 194 Cal. App. 2d
343, 15 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1961) ; In re Eddie Jones, California Precedent Dec. No. 106,
compiled in CALIF. INDEX - DIGEST OF PRECEDENT DECISIONS 78 (Aug. 1971).
In the latter case, a majority held that a seaman was discharged for misconduct based
on insubordination even though he remained on board for one week after the incident
and left under the mandatory terms of a collective bargaining agreement. A minority
of the Appeals Board found that the immediate circumstances and the time of leaving
were involuntary and not subject to disqualification. According to the minority,
[VOL. 17 : p. 635
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In most cases, the employer will seek to establish, and benefit from,
a finding that the employee quit the job, whereas the employee will
seek to establish a finding of discharge by the employer. The reason
for such positions lies in the fact that all states impose the difficult
burden of proving scienter on the employer in misconduct cases.' 7
In order to disqualify a claimant on the basis of misconduct, some
evidence of knowing or reckless conduct by the employee either in his
job or his job related activities must be shown.' 8 In contrast, in the
voluntary quit situation, the employee's state of mind is generally not
at issue so long as the leaving itself is volitional. The theoretical
divergence of these concepts may 'be less critical in those jurisdictions
which apply to a firing the doctrines of "constructive quit," "provoca-
tion of discharge" or "abandonment of employment."' 9 The rationale
behind these concepts is that an employee who brings on his own
unemployment should not have the benefit of the same substantive
and procedural advantages afforded a claimant whose employer asserts
that the discharge was for misconduct. In some cases, however, these
concepts have been misapplied or expanded to dilute the element of
scienter in cases of discharge for misconduct. It should be noted that
these doctrines have evolved without statutory basis in most states and
generally have come about through administrative rules.
Once the separation has been termed a voluntary leaving on the
basis of circumstances surrounding the departure, the "good cause"
exception must be explored. In cases of voluntary quitting, the em-
ployee has the burden of establishing that his leaving was with good
cause.2" In addition, cases of voluntary leaving do not have the same
retention of the employee aboard the ship after the incident condoned the alleged
misconduct.
17. Maywood Glass Co. v. Stewart, 170 Cal. App. 2d 719, 339 P.2d 947 (1959);
cf. Rasmussen v. Gem State Packing, 83 Idaho 198, 360 P.2d 90 (1961) (placing
the burden of proof on employees to establish their eligibility, including establishing
good cause for leaving).
18. Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249, 296 N.W. 636 (1941) cited in
Maywood Glass Co. v. Stewart, 170 Cal. App. 2d 719, 724, 339 P.2d 94', 950-51
(1959).
19. This concept of "constructive quitting" or "provocation of discharge" appears
strongest in New York. See Monahan v. Catherwood, 27 App. Div. 2d 781, 277
N.Y.S.2d 229 (1967). See pp. 652-53 and accompanying notes infra. California has
applied the concept in at least one appellate case and in several benefit decisions.
Sherman-Bertram, Inc. v. Department of Emp., 202 Cal. App. 2d 733, 21 Cal. Rptr.
130 (1962).
20. The difficulty of proving good cause for a voluntary leaving is stated, some-
what whimsically, by the Pennsylvania supreme court:
"[G]ood cause" as used in the Act is obviously meant such a cause as justifies
an employee's voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed . . . . For example,
if an employee was compelled to work in a position where his life was constantly
menaced by a heavy object over his head which was suspended from the ceiling
by a palpably inadequate or defective chain, he could successfully plead "good
cause" for voluntarily leaving his employment. The same would be true if he
was compelled to work under inexcusable conditions which were palpably
MARCH 1972]
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procedural advantages as cases of discharge for misconduct." In some
states, presumptions are applied to help resolve the issue of whether an
employee left his job or was fired." A controlling factor often in-
volves appraising the objective manifestations of the employee's intent
at the time of separation; that is, whether his actions are consistent
with a real desire to continue working.23 Thus, if an employee leaves
detrimental to his health, such as working in a mine or a factory where the
supply of fresh air was obviously insufficient to sustain life.Sun Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 358 Pa. 224, 228, 56A.2d 254, 258 (1948). An exception, California's rule, different from the majority
of states, places the burden of proof on the employer in both misconduct and
voluntary quit cases. Yellow Cab Co. v. Unemployment Ins. App. Bd., 194 Cal. App.2d 343, 15 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1961). In order to disqualify an employee who isdischarged, the employer must establish willful misconduct connected with the job.See, e.g., Maywood Glass Co. v. Stewart, 170 Cal. App. 2d 719, 339 P.2d 947 (1959).21. One major procedural disadvantage involves a somewhat more limited judicialreview of a disqualification based on voluntary leaving, as opposed to misconduct.The reviewing court will usually show great deference to the fact findings and
expertise of the administrative agency. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Catherwood, 22App. Div. 2d 995, 254 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1964). In California, however, provisions fortrial de novo allow the court to make independent determinations of factual issues.Thomas v. Employment Security Comm'n, 39 Cal. 2d 501, 247 P.2d 561 (1952).
Secondly, unlike voluntary leaving situations, if the issue involves a dischargefor willful misconduct, the administrative agency and the reviewing court may
require some competent evidence to establish misconduct. Huddleston v. Brown, 124So. 2d 225 (La. Ct. App. 1960) ("legal, competent and sufficient proof"); Phila-delphia Transp. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 191 Pa. Super. 91, 155 A.2d 377(1959) (affirming the Board's refusal to uphold a finding of misconduct based onhearsay written notes of anonymous investigators for a transit company that observed
violations of company fare rules). See also Paulsen v. Catherwood, 27 App. Div. 2d493, 280 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1967) ; cf. Redner v. Workman's Comp. App. Bd., 5 Cal. 3d 83,485 P.2d 799, 95 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1971). In Redner, the court disapproved of the
admission of non-disablement motion pictures taken furtively by investigators. Nor-mally, any relevant evidence may be offered at such hearings, as the usual technicalrules of evidence are not applied. Rather, the hearings are conducted in such a
manner as to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties, admitting almost any
relevant evidence. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1952 (West Supp. 1971);N.Y. LABOR LAW § 622 (McKinney 1965).22. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1030(c) (West Supp. 1971). Thecited section provides for a rebuttable presumption of leaving without good cause wherean employee leaves the job or is absent without notifying the employer of the reasonstherefor. It apparently overrules the decision in Yellow Cab Co. v. UnemploymentIns. App. Bd., 194 Cal. App. 2d 343, 15 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1961). The Yellow Cab Co.
court held that unexplained absence from work was, under the circumstances, a
voluntary quit and that the employer did not sustain the burden of proving that theemployee left without good cause. The court refused to accept a presumption of lack
of good cause from unexplained absence.Other states have, by judicial interpretation, inferred a voluntary quitwithout good cause from unexplained absence from work without notice to theemployer. E.g., Williams v. Catherwood, 21 App. Div. 2d 886, 278 N.Y.S.2d 4(1967); Maltese v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 190 Pa. Super. 123, 152 A.2d 773(1959).
23. Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. Employment Comm'n, 17 Cal. 2d 321, 109 P.2d 935(1941), cited in Yellow Cab Co. v. Unemployment Ins. App. Bd., 194 Cal. App. 2d343, 15 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1961). See also Warner Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd.,396 Pa. 545, 153 A.2d 906 (1959). In Warner, the court awarded benefits to anemployee who was forced to retire under compulsory provisions of a collectivebargaining contract. Another prevalent issue of volition in leaving the job concernstermination of employment of pregnant female workers who are required to leave
under such conditions by the employment contract. Generally, if the employee is
able and willing to work, and leaves solely because of the contract, benefits will beallowed. See Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Unemployment Ins. App. Bd., 180 Cal. App. 2d636, 4 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1960); Myerson v. Board of Rev., 43 N.J. Super. 196, 128
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the job, but his employer forced him to go, his claim must be analyzed
as a discharge rather than an involuntary leaving. By the same token,
if an employer discharges an employee, but the surrounding circum-
stances indicate that the voluntary conduct of the employee forced or
provoked the firing, then the claim is usually analyzed under the doc-
trine of "constructive quit" or "provocation of discharge."24
The notion of voluntary quitting without good cause involves
two levels of volition: (1) the immediate circumstances of leaving
must reflect a subjective intent of the employee to terminate; and (2)
the act of leaving must be an exercise of free will and not the product
of other compelling reasons or pressures forcing him to leave. It is
the second level of the volition that concerns the ultimate issue of
whether or not the employee has quit for good cause.
The general standard of good cause involves a strict test of the
employee's good faith in leaving the job and the substantiality of the
circumstances and pressures which overcome his desire to stay. In
Portland Cement Co. v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board,25
the court described the test as follows:
Of course, "good cause" and "personal reasons" are flexible
phrases. ... Reducing them to a fixed, definite and rigid stand-
ard, if desirable, is necessarily difficult, if not impossible. How-
ever, in whatever context they appear, they connote, as minimum
requirements, real circumstances, subtantial reasons, objective
conditions, palpable forces that operate to produce correlative
results, adequate excuses that will bear the test of reason, just
grounds for action, and always the element of good faith.2"
This standard apparently represents a minority view, for in most states
good cause must involve the pressures or circumstances of the job
itself.2 7 Personal or extraneous reasons, compelling though they may
A.2d 15 (1957); Smith v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 396 Pa. 557, 154 A.2d 492(1959), citing Warner Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 396 Pa. 545, 153 A.2d 906(1959). Contra, Bergseth v. Zinsmaster Baking Co., 252 Minn. 63, 89 N.W.2d 172(1958) (holding that an employee who automatically retired from her employmentpursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement was not entitled to
receive unemployment benefits). The volitional element of the original contract
negotiation in a collective bargaining agreement is generally deemed too remote andlimited to effect a waiver of important rights. Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Unemploy-
ment Ins. App. Bd., 180 Cal. App. 2d 636, 646-48, 4 Cal. Rptr. 723, 729-31 (1960).
In Employment Security Comm'n v. Appeal Bd., 356 Mich. 665, 97 N.W.2d 784(1959), the court held that an employee did not voluntarily leave the job when he was
convicted and imprisoned as a result of driving offenses.
24. See pp. 653-54 infra.
25. 178 Cal. App. 2d 263, 3 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1960).26. Id. at 272-73, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 43, citing Bliley Elec. Co. v. Unemployment
Comp. Bd., 158 Pa. Super. 548, 45 A.2d 898 (1946). A similar standard is quoted inDepartment of Indus. Rel. v. Mann, 35 Ala. App. 505, 510, 50 So. 2d 780, 784 (1950).
27. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.531 (Supp. 1971). The cited sectionqualifies a claimant who "[h]as left his work voluntarily without good cause
attributable to his employer ...."
MARCH 1972]
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be, are usually disqualifying.2" Moreover, some practical differences
exist between the two views; for example, while all jurisdictions permit
the award of unemployment compensation if the working conditions
caused the illness which compelled the employee to leave the job,2 9
the majority, unlike the minority, would exclude benefits from claim-
ants unable to work due to mental or physical health problems aggra-
vated, although not caused, by working conditions."°
Most claimants who voluntarily leave their job probably do so for
work-related and not personal reasons. What then are the working
conditions which will afford good cause for leaving? Exploitation of
employees, either in the form of unsafe and unhealthy facilities or in
the form of depressed wages, is universally considered to be a com-
pelling reason for quitting.8 1 Such practices conflict with the purposes
of the unemployment compensation system which seek to encourage
enlightened employment practices and to protect workers from unsafe
or unhealthy facilities.8 2 Charging the reserve account of such em-
28. See, e.g., N.Y. LABOR LAW § 593(b) (McKinney 1965), which expressly
disqualifies an employee who loses employment due to marriage or relocation in
another area with his or her spouse. See also OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4141.29(D) (2) (C) (disqualifying an employee who quit for marital, parental, or otherdomestic obligations); Hargrove v. Brown, 247 La. 689, 174 So. 2d 120 (1965);Sheffield v. Heard, 92 So. 2d 295 (La. Ct. App. 1957). Contra, Berry, Whitson &Berry v. Division of Emp. Security, 21 N.J. 73, 120 A.2d 742 (1956). EarlyPennsylvania cases suggested that an employee who left the job to relocate with herhusband or to get married had good cause for voluntarily leaving. Department ofLabor & Indus. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 154 Pa. Super. 250, 35 A.2d 739(1944). However, section 802 (PA. STAT. tit. 43, § 802 (1964)) was amended in1953 to disqualify persons leaving jobs due to marital or domestic circumstances.Watson v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 176 Pa. Super. 490, 109 A.2d 215 (1955). Ifthe jurisdiction does not demand that good cause be work-connected, then compellingfamily circumstances may be good cause for leaving. Lauria v. Catherwood, 18 App.Div. 2d 848, 236 N.Y.S.2d 168, amended on other grounds, 18 App. Div. 2d 1047,238 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1963). But cf. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1264 (West 1956),
which bars benefits to a claimant who leaves to get married or relocate with his orher spouse, unless such person is the sole or major support of the family.29. The payment of benefits is not actually allowed until the claimant is
available and able to do suitable work. E.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1253(c) (WestSupp. 1971); MICe. STAT. ANN. § 17.531 (Supp. 1971); N.Y. LABOR LAW § 591(2)(McKinney 1965). A supplemental program of state disability benefits usually fillsthe gap until the claimant recovers and is eligible for unemployment. See, e.g., CAL.
UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2607 (West 1956). Of course, work-connected injury or illness
may be the subject of an additional claim under the workmen's compensation laws.Benefits paid by the unemployment insurance system or state disability fund pendingthe workmen's compensation claim will be priority liens on any award. See, e.g.,
CAL. LABOR CODE § 4903 (West Supp. 1971) ; Garcia v. Industrial Accident Comm'n,
41 Cal. 2d 689, 263 P.2d 8 (1953).30. See, e.g., West Point Mfg. Co. v. Keith, 35 Ala. App. 414, 47 So. 2d 594(1950). There, benefits were not allowed to an employee who left a job that
aggravated a pre-existing glandular condition but did not cause the disability. The
minority view is expressed in Sledzianowski v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 168 Pa.Super. 37, 76 A.2d 666 (1950), where the court held that the claimant's refusal of
an offer of employment was with good cause in view of his previous medical history.31. Robertson v. Brown, 139 So. 2d 226 (La. Ct. App. 1962) (reduction of
wage from $60.00 to $37.69 weekly gave claimant good cause for leaving).32. Many statutes bar the suspension of benefits for refusal to accept work at
wages, hours or conditions substantially lower than the prevailing ones. See, e.g.,
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ployers punishes those practices and deters future violations. Before
leaving the job, however, the employee has a legal duty to call the
defects to the employer's attention and to permit him to remedy them.8
Moreover, minor health or safety violations and difficult job conditions
are not compelling reasons for leaving. 4
The determination of whether low wages constitute good cause
for leaving employment varies from state to state. If the wage is
materially lower than the prevailing wage for that work in the com-
munity, most jurisdictions do not disqualify the claimant.8 5 Union scale
is not generally taken as the prevailing wage rate. If low wages reach
the point of labor exploitation, of course, every state recognizes the
worker's eligibility for benefits if he leaves the job. A related question
is whether a reduction of wages or worsening of working conditions
after the worker has been on the job will constitute good cause. The
prevailing rule is that a reduction in wages must be substantial in
order to constitute good cause for voluntary leaving.86 While this
principle is universally accepted, its practical application varies con-
siderably. Thus, in a California case, 7 a waitress whose wages were
reduced by 25 per cent was not disqualified for leaving, while in a
Pennsylvania case,8 8 a worker whose wages were reduced 46 cents
per hour from $2.12 to $1.68 was disqualified for leaving without
good cause. Apart from wage reductions, other economic pressures
related to the job may be considered cause for leaving. Where an
employee had his entire wages garnished for two weeks to pay back
taxes on a low-paying job, he was qualified for benefits even though
he voluntarily left the job. "9 If working -conditions other than wages
CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1259(b) (West 1956); MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.531(6),17.531(7) (Supp. 1971); N.Y. LABOR LAW § 593(2)(d) (McKinney 1965); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 108.04(9) (1957).33. Kansky v. Catherwood, 27 App. Div. 2d 887, 277 N.Y.S.2d 777 (1967).34. See Department of Indus. Rel. v. Mann, 35 Ala. App. 505, 50 So. 2d 780(1950), wherein work conditions involving "petty irritations" were held not to be
good cause for leaving.
35. See note 32 supra; T. BRODEN, supra note 1, at 443.36. Alabama Textile Prod. Corp. v. Rodgers, 38 Ala. App. 206, 82 So. 2d 267(1955); Bunny's Waffle Shop, Inc. v. Employment Comm'n, 24 Cal. 2d 735, 151P.2d 224 (1944); McGinnis v. Moreau, 149 So. 2d 188 (La. 1963); Martin v.Unemployment Comp. Bd., 196 Pa. Super. 293, 175 A.2d 116 (1961).37. Bunny's Waffle Shop, Inc. v. Employment Comm'n, 24 Cal. 2d 735, 151 P.2d
224 (1944).
38. Martin v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 196 Pa. Super. 293, 175 A.2d 116(1961). See also Fegely Unemployment Comp. Case, 192 Pa. Super. 141, 159 A.2d 574(1960) (claimant disqualified when he refused a different job in the company at
a reduction in hourly wages from $2.39 to $1.89). In re Anderson, 39 Wash. 2d 356,235 P.2d 303 (1951) (held that a 12 per cent pay reduction was not good cause
for leaving).
39. Jones v. Catherwood, 19 App. Div. 2d 330, 242 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1963),
aff'd mem., 14 N.Y.2d 558, 198 N.E.2d 40, 248 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1964); cf. Larson v.Employment Security Comm'n, 2 Mich. App. 540, 140 N.W.2d 777 (1966). InLarson, the court held that a claimant who, under economic duress, signed a settlement
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deteriorate, then again the employee must establish that they are
material and try to mediate his grievance with the employer before
leaving.40 Sometimes unemployment results from the employee's in-
ability or incapacity to do the job, as where he engages in conduct
leading to license suspension or incarceration.4 While these issues
usually arise in misconduct cases, they also come up in voluntary leaving
cases as well.4" Although a few Michigan cases find good cause or
that the leaving was involuntary in these circumstances,43 an award
of benefits is rare, even if the violations leading to the license sus-
pension or incarceration were negligent acts.44 Thus, even if the
immediate circumstances of leaving are involuntary, such as missing
work due to incarceration or license suspension, a disqualification for
"voluntary leaving" results because of the element of volition in the
drinking, driving or other act just prior to the involuntary condition.
If the factor of volition is remote in time and causation, then logically
the leaving should be deemed involuntary and not disqualifying.
III. MISCONDUCT
While the issues of volition and good cause are difficult ones, the
most mysterious area of unemployment insurance lies in the meaning
of "willful misconduct." A disqualification based on willful misconduct
is a universal feature of the unemployment insurance scheme. One
who brings about his own unemployment, by circumstances under
his control, becomes voluntarily unemployed or unemployed by his
agreement providing for termination of his employment did not voluntarily leave his
work without good cause. For a discussion of the application of misconduct dis-
qualifications to employees whose wages are garnished, see p. 647 and accompanying
notes infra.
40. Bunny's Waffle Shop, Inc. v. Employment Comm'n, 24 Cal. 2d 735, 151 P.2d
224 (1944). An example of immaterial changes in working conditions is illustrated
by a New York case where a taxi driver left his job when told to drive an automatic
shift cab after forty years of driving a standard shift. Fitzsimmons v. Catherwood,
10 App. Div. 2d 738, 197 N.Y.S.2d 498 (1960).
41. See pp. 650-52 and accompanying notes infra.
42. Employment Security Comm'n v. Appeal Bd., 356 Mich. 665, 97 N.W.2d 784
(1959) (absence due to incarceration); Echols v. Employment Security Comm'n,
4 Mich. App. 173, 144 N.W.2d 666 (1966) (taxi driver unemployed as a result of
a license suspension denied compensation) ; Donahue v. Catherwood, 33 App. Div. 2d
848, 305 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1969) (license suspension due to refusal to take blood test
for alcohol held to be leaving employment without good cause).
43. Sullivan v. Appeal Bd., 358 Mich. 338, 100 N.W.2d 713 (1960) (claimant
missed work due to incarceration following conviction for drunkenness) ; Employment
Security Comm'n v. Appeal Bd., 356 Mich. 665, 97 N.W.2d 784 (1959) (awarding
benefits to a claimant who missed work for fifteen days during incarceration for
driving without a license). The Michigan statute now provides a specific dis-
qualification for claimants who lose their jobs as a result of convictions, unless they
are given "day parole" or sentenced to less than ten days for a traffic offense, MicI.
STAT. ANN. § 17.531(1) (f) (Supp. 1971).
44. See, e.g., Echols v. Employment Security Comm'n, 4 Mich. App. 173, 144
N.W.2d 666 (1966) ; Donahue v. Catherwood, 33 App. Div. 2d 848, 305 N.Y.S.2d 827
(1969).
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own fault. The general thrust of the disqualification has been stated
in the case of Maywood Glass Co. v. Stewart :
[T]he term "misconduct" . . . is limited to conduct evincing
such willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interests as is
found in deliberate violations or disregard of standards of behavior
which the employer has the right to expect of his employee, or
in carelessness or negligence of such degree or recurrence as to
manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to
show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer's
interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to his em-
ployer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory
conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or
incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated in-
stances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not
to be deemed "misconduct" within the meaning of the statute .4
The four elements of willful misconduct are: (1) a material duty
owed by the claimant to the employer; (2) a substantial breach of
that duty; (3) such breach being a willful or wanton disregard of that
duty; and (4) a disregard of the employer's interests. 47 Despite this
statement and other attempts to clarify its meaning, "willful miscon-
duct" is almost inherently vague and imprecise. The most trouble-
some aspect is the application of the scienter element, since direct proof
of malice or ill-will is rarely available. As a result, administrative
agencies and reviewing courts permit indirect and circumstantial evi-
dence and allow a presumption of scienter in various cases.48 Employers
have attempted to aid in ascertaining misconduct to some extent by
adopting company rules governing the employment relationship and
evidencing material duties owed by employees.49 By applying the doc-
trines of "constructive quit" and "provocation of discharge," the issues
45. 170 Cal. App. 2d 719, 339 P.2d 947 (1959), citing Boynton Cab Co. v.
Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249, 253, 296 N.W. 636, 640 (1941). The court in Maywood
Glass Co. upheld an allowance of benefits to an employee discharged for having
packed defective glassware. For a similar interpretation of willful misconduct, see
Reed v. Employment Security Comm'n, 364 Mich. 395, 110 N.W.2d 907 (1961).
46. 170 Cal. App. 2d at 724, 339 P.2d at 950-51.
47. Maywood Glass Co. v. Stewart, 170 Cal. App. 2d 719, 724, 339 P.2d 947,
950-51 (1959) ; Sewell v. Sharp, 102 So. 2d 259, 261 (La. Ct. App. 1958) ; Boynton
Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249, 253, 296 N.W. 636, 640 (1941). The issue of
misconduct does not test the reasonableness of discharging the employee. Reed
v. Employment Security Comm'n, 364 Mich. 395, 397, 110 N.W.2d 907, 908 (1961).
48. Stout v. Department of Emp., 172 Cal. App. 2d 666, 342 P.2d 918 (1959)
(circumstantial evidence of disloyalty) ; Phillips v. Appeal Bd., 373 Mich. 210, 128
N.W.2d 527 (1964) (inferring willfulness from several acts of bad driving causing
license revocation) ; Rivera v. Catherwood, 28 App. Div. 2d 1036, 283 N.Y.S.2d 676
(1967) (permitting use of circumstantial evidence and double-hearsay to prove
employee's conduct of illegal activities on business premises).
49. See, e.g., Reed v. Employment Security Comm'n, 364 Mich. 395, 110 N.W.2d
907 (1961) (company rule against successive wage garnishments) ; Glassmith v.
Catherwood, 27 App. Div. 2d 584, 275 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1966) (company rule against
conversing with cashier).
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of willful misconduct have sometimes been avoided. Finally, where
intent or willfulness are unclear, a continued pattern of poor conduct
or rule violations may be adequate proof.50 Despite the ambiguities
of meaning and application, some guidelines have evolved. Poor
workmanship or job performance reflecting carelessness or negligence, 5'
inability to do the job52 or lack of judgment do not disqualify the
claimant. On the other hand, deliberate falsifications of employment
information or job records,"3 repeated and deliberate violations of
employers' instructions after warning,5 4 excessive tardiness after warn-
ing55 and drunkenness or drinking on the job5" are deemed to be willful
misconduct. Insubordinate conduct or disloyalty by the employee,
especially after warning, disqualifies him for benefits,5 7 although bene-
fits may be allowed if the refusal is attributable to reasonable fears of
compliance or a nervous or mental condition. Beyond these limited
areas of relative certainty, willful misconduct eludes precise meaning.
50. Miller v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 359 Mich. 342, 102 N.W.2d 728 (1960);
Lewis v. Catherwood, 25 App. Div. 2d 473, 265 N.Y.S.2d 997 (1966) (applying concept
of "provocation of discharge" to repeated refusals to heed employer's instructions);
Sabatelli v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 168 Pa. Super. 85, 76 A.2d 654 (1950) (dis-
qualifying claimant for repeated improper fare registrations as bus driver even in
the absence of fraud or harm to the employer).
51. Maywood Glass Co. v. Stewart, 170 Cal. App. 2d 719, 339 P.2d 947 (1959)
Yellow Cab Co. v. Stewart, 111 So. 2d 142 (La. Ct. App. 1959) ; Wickey v. Appeal
Bd., 369 Mich. 487, 120 N.W.2d 181 (1963) ; McClain, Inc. v. Unemployment Comp.
Bd., 170 Pa. Super. 119, 84 A.2d 521 (1951) (oyster shucker who damaged only
oysters with irregular, hard to open configurations was not disqualified).
52. Maywood Glass Co. v. Stewart, 170 Cal. App. 2d 719, 339 P.2d 947 (1959).
53. Sackner Prods., Inc. v. Employment Security Comm'n, 8 Mich. App. 81,
153 N.W.2d 674 (1967) ; Mirra v. Catherwood, 31 App. Div. 2d 703, 295 N.Y.S.2d 775(1968). Disqualification or temporary suspension of benefits occurs if a claimant
willfully falsifies his application or registration in order to qualify for benefits. See,
e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1257 (West 1956) ; N.Y. LABOR LAW § 594 (McKinney
Supp. 1971) ; PA. STAT. tit. 43, § 871 (1964).
54. Sewell v. Sharp, 102 So. 2d 259 (La. Ct. App. 1958) ; Carter v. EmploymentSecurity Comm'n, 364 Mich. 538, 111 N.W.2d 817 (1961) ; Arcicovich v. Catherwood,
31 App. Div. 2d 581, 294 N.Y.S.2d 951 (1968). Where the instruction or order is
unreasonable, a few states do not consider disobedience to be misconduct.
55. Chapman v. Division of Emp. Security, 104 So. 2d 201 (La. Ct. App. 1958);
Becker v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 198 Pa. Super. 184, 181 A.2d 869 (1962).
56. Green v. Brown, 136 So. 2d 147 (La. Ct. App. 1962) ; Fahy v. Catherwood,29 App. Div. 2d 712, 286 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1968). Unless probative and competent
evidence of intoxication on the job is presented, a finding of misconduct by intoxication
will not be made. Paulsen v. Catherwood, 27 App. Div. 2d 493, 280 N.Y.S.2d 491(1967) ; General Elec. Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 160 Pa. Super. 636,53 A.2d 819 (1947). No cases have been decided where the intoxicated employee
asserts alcoholism, an illness, as a defense negating volition. Cf. Powell v. Texas,
392 U.S. 514 (1968). In Adams v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 186 Pa. Super. 417,
142 A.2d 207 (1958), an award was upheld where the employee was hospitalized with
delirium tremens because the Board had found that his discharge was for illness and
not for drinking during working hours.
57. Stout v. Department of Emp., 172 Cal. App. 2d 666, 342 P.2d 918 (1959);
Williams v. Lakeland Convalescent Center, Inc., 4 Mich. App. 477, 145 N.W.2d 272(1966) ; Cohen v. Catherwood, 25 App. Div. 2d 906, 269 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1966).
58. Osojnick v. Review Bd., 129 Ind. App. 545, 158 N.E.2d 656 (1959) (employee
disputed work order, became ill and went home) ; First State Bank v. Keegan, 366Mich. 544, 115 N.W.2d 375 (1962) (nervous condition) ; Sledzianowski v. Unemploy-
ment Comp. Bd., 168 Pa. Super. 37, 76 A.2d 666 (1950) (refusal of allergic employee
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The biggest category of misconduct cases involves applicants who
are discharged for violating a company rule or order. Violation of
a company rule does not constitute misconduct unless at least two
essential elements are met: (1) the rule must embody a material duty
owed to the employer in connection with the job; and (2) the viola-
tion must be intentional, deliberate or with conscious indifference to
the consequences." A prime example of a rule not qualifying under the
first criterion is a company policy against wage garnishments.6" While
wage garnishments are obviously related to the job and involve a
degree of wrongdoing, the subject of the rule does not directly concern
the employment.6 ' Moreover, such a rule wrongly presumes the ability
of the employee to control and avoid financial distress. Lack of a
sufficient nexus between the rule and employment is, however, quite
rare ;62 so long as the employer can demonstrate some need for the
rule in his business, a deliberate violation will be disqualifying.13 A
to spray paint). In these cases, the employee must establish that the refusal is based
on a real physical or mental threat from compliance. Otherwise, the refusal constitutes
insubordination. Carter v. Employment Security Comm'n, 364 Mich. 538, 111 N.W.2d
817 (1961). Unless the claimant supports his refusal with strong medical evidence, he
will be disqualified.
59. Yellow Cab. Co. v. Stewart, 111 So. 2d 142 (La. Ct. App. 1959) ; Wickey
v. Appeal Bd., 369 Mich. 487, 120 N.W.2d 181 (1963); Philadelphia Transp. Co. v.
Unemployment Comp. Bd., 186 Pa. Super. 142, 141 A.2d 410 (1958) ; Boynton Cab
Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249, 296 N.W. 636 (1941).
60. Reed v. Employment Security Comm'n, 364 Mich. 395, 110 N.W.2d 907(1961) (overruling numerous prior cases). The treatment of wage garnishment as
misconduct has undoubtedly been altered by the enactment of the federal Consumer
Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (1970), limiting the amount of
wages subject to garnishment and barring discharge from employment by reason of
garnishment for a single indebtedness. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1673, 1674 (1970). An even
more obvious example of a non-qualifying and job-unrelated rule is a good credit
condition of employment. Such rules are termed "rules of employment selection," as
opposed to rules measuring job performance. Kempfer, supra note 4, at 163-64. On
the other hand, an employee who leaves the job rather than submit to repeated
wage garnishments by creditors leaves without good cause. Vayne v. Department
of Emp., 200 Cal. App. 2d 517, 19 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1962).
61. Reed v. Employment Security Comm'n, 364 Mich. 395, 397-98, 110 N.W.2d
907, 908 (1961).
62. Dress and personal appearance rules illustrate this point. Almost any
business operation will have needs related to such rules. In a "long-hair" case, In re
Stephen Shelton, California Precedent Dec. No. 87, compiled in CALIF. INDEX -
DIGEST OF PRECEDENT DECISIONS 79 (Aug. 1971), now on appeal, employees work-
ing on the guided tours at Paul Masson Vineyards refused to obey detailed com-
pany rules governing hair length, moustaches and sideburns. The Appeals Board
disqualified them on the basis that the employer has a right to demand reasonable
grooming standards necessary to its business and that any incidental deprivation
of constitutional rights is justified. A minority of the Board dissented, stating that
relinquishment of constitutional rights of privacy may not be made a condition to
receipt of unemployment benefits. In support of its position, the minority cited
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (refusal of a Seventh Day Adventist to
accept Saturday employment not disqualifying) and Svrek v. Unemployment Ins.
Bd., 54 Cal. 2d 519, 354 P.2d 625, 7 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1960) (holding that applicant
had good cause to refuse the civil service job offered to him because it involved a
loyalty oath to which applicant had a sincere conscientious objection).
63. Rules which operate as conditions of employment and are unrelated to actualjob performance have been labelled "rules of selection" and "rules of suitability."
Kempfer, supra note 4, at 163-65. However, such rules may also relate to the
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second, and more forceful limitation on employment orders or rules
as a ground for misconduct is that they be reasonable. 4 Disobedience
of a rule or an order which imposes unreasonable burdens on the
employee is not misconduct. However, once the importance of the
duty embodied in a rule has been established, further inquiry into the
relative reasonableness of that duty will not be made. A final restric-
tion on the promulgation and enforcement of company rules on mis-
conduct relating to their materiality relates to "dead letter" rules.
Disuse and lack of enforcement generally bar any reliance on rule
violations in unemployment hearings, even if the employee is aware of
the rule and its content. 65 Since one aim of the unemployment insur-
ance program is to protect the reasonable expectations of the employee
and his employer, and since lack of enforcement suggests both an expec-
tation of the employee that the rule will not be enforced and an attitude
of the employer regarding the rule or its infraction as unimportant,
the breach may be looked upon as innocent, making disqualifica-
tion unjust.
However, even if the materiality of the rule and the duty are
established, it must be shown that the breach of the rule is deliberate.
The proper handling of fares or cash is probably an exception to this
rule. 66 Apparently, the importance of the duty owed to the employer
justifies the emasculation of the elements of willfulness or intent to
violate a rule which requires the proper handling of fares and cash.
Thus, even innocent or minor breaches may be punished by disallow-
operation of the business. Thus, an employee's off-the-job moral conduct can affect
the reputation and goodwill of the business. A few instances of ultra vires rules
have been reported in which the employer sought to regulate the private affairs of
his employees. One commentator has suggested that even an intentional violation of
a company rule unrelated to actual job performance cannot be grounds for misconduct.
The problem is that few rules, if any, will be considered as such. Kempfer, supra
note 4, at 164.
64. Lacy v. Unemployment Ins. App. Bd., 17 Cal. App. 3d 1128, 95 Cal. Rptr. 566
(1971) (upholding trial court's determination that benefits should be awarded to
demoted employee who refused to train her replacement on the ground that the
refusal was reasonable). CAL. LABOR CODE § 2856 (West Supp. 1971) requires
employees to obey all orders of their employer unless compliance would impose new
and unreasonable burdens upon the employees.
65. Earp v. Department of Commerce Indus. Rel. Comm'n, 241 So. 2d 422
(Fla. Ct. App. 1970) (violation of unenforced policy regarding warehouse purchases
held not disqualifying). Compare Monahan v. Catherwood, 27 App. Div. 2d 781,
277 N.Y.S.2d 229 (1967) (disqualifying a worker for violation of time card rule
that everyone else ignored).
66. Glassmith v. Catherwood, 27 App. Div. 2d 584, 275 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1966)
(disregard for company rule prohibiting talking with cashier disqualified claimant
from benefits) ; Coschi v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 186 Pa. Super. 154, 141 A.2d 416
(1958); Sabatelli v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 168 Pa. Super. 85, 76 A.2d 654
(1950). Contra, Spaulding v. Industrial Comm'n, 154 So. 2d 334 (Fla. Ct. App.
1963).
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ing benefits.6 7 Obviously, however, this exception deviates from the
legislative intent of the misconduct disqualification. Aside from this
exception, most misconduct violations require a showing of some
willful or deliberate action on the part of the employee. While the
requisite intent does not require that the employee either intended to
injure the employer or had some other specific intent, it does require
more than the mere voluntary commission of a wrongful act."8 The
wrongful act must be knowingly committed or must be done under
circumstances showing wanton disregard or indifference to the em-
ployer's interests. If the -conduct consists of breaching a company rule
or order, then it must be knowingly done.69 Thus, if the employee did
not know about the employer's instruction 70 or if the company policy
is unclear and vague,7' a conclusion of misconduct cannot be predicated
on disobedience of the company rule.
Despite the fact that, theoretically, breach of a duty owed to
the employer should be tested by the same principles of misconduct,
including scienter, whether or not that duty is incorporated into a
company policy or order, both Pennsylvania and California,72 and
other states sometimes require a lesser type of knowing conduct in
cases involving company rule violations. 73 The dilution of the scienter
requirement in these jurisdictions has been justly criticized:
67. Glassmith v. Catherwood, 27 App. Div. 2d 584, 275 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1966);
Coschi v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 186 Pa. Super. 154, 141 A.2d 416 (1958).
68. See generally T. BRODEN, supra note 1, at 469-70.69. Spaulding v. Industrial Comm'n, 154 So. 2d 334 (Fla. Ct. App. 1963) (evi-dence of inadvertent failure to ring cash sale promptly, in violation of company rule,is not disqualifying); Sosa v. Catherwood, 32 App. Div. 2d 864, 301 N.Y.S.2d 299(1969) ; Atlantic Freight Lines, Inc. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 188 Pa. Super. 185,146 A.2d 367 (1958) ; In re Wilson, CCH Pov. L. REP. 1 12,994, at 12,816 (employee
not guilty of misconduct unless he has actual knowledge of the rule).
70. Spencer v. Catherwood, 30 App. Div. 2d 986, 294 N.Y.S.2d 91 (1968);Atlantic Freight Lines, Inc. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 188 Pa. Super. 185, 146
A.2d 367 (1958).
71. Earp v. Department of Commerce Indus. Rel. Comm'n, 241 So. 2d 422 (Fla.
Ct. App. 1970) ; Andrews v. Catherwood, 29 App. Div. 2d 807, 286 N.Y.S.2d 870(1968).
72. Both Pennsylvania and California have on occasion substituted constructive
notice for actual knowledge in company rule violation cases. See Coschi v. Unemploy-
ment Comp. Bd., 168 Pa. Super. 154, 141 A.2d 416 (1958) ; In re Frances Gatler,California Precedent Dec. No. 108, compiled in CALIF. INDEX - DIGEST OF PRECEDENT
DECISIONs 79 (Aug. 1971). However, actual notice is sometimes demanded. Atlantic
Freight Lines, Inc. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 188 Pa. Super. 185, 146 A.2d
367 (1958).73. Compare Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249, 296 N.W. 636 (1941)(allowing benefits to a cab driver who was discharged for having numerous accidents),
with Checker Cab Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 242 Wis. 429, 8 N.W.2d 286 (1943)(disqualifying claimant for negligent driving and violations of a company rule).In Checker Cab Co., the court upheld a finding of misconduct even though the
circumstances immediately surrounding the separation did not establish misconduct.
In so doing, the court relied on the series of incidents over a substantial period of
time which evidenced disregard for the employer's interests. In the absence of
such cumulative acts, the single act of the employee precipitating his firing would
not be considered misconduct. See Kempfer, supra note 4, at 161.
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Misconduct is conduct that is wrong. Plaintiff's conduct
here involved was the incurring of an indebtedness and failure to
discharge it. By some standards it may have been wrong. Whether
or not, for the purpose of cases like this, it was disqualifying mis-
conduct depends on the legislative intent and meaning of the
statute and not merely on the promulgation of a company rule
against garnishments. Garnishment of plaintiff's wages may well
have been a nuisance to defendant company. Many acts of an
employee might meet with the displeasure or disapproval of an
employer and be prohibited by rule by him. Breach of such rule
might, in a sense, be considered misconduct warranting discharge
from employment. Unless the rule and its violation bear some
reasonable application and relation to the employee's task, can
the breach be said to be misconduct within the disqualifying
language ... of the statute? The purpose of the act is to benefit
unemployed in financial straits, not to penalize them for being
in that condition. We do not believe that the language of the
statute discloses or its purpose permits reading into it a legislative
intent to stamp the conduct here involved as misconduct within
the meaning [of the act].14
A second dilution of the scienter requirement and a further basis
for criticizing judicial reasoning has been the tendency of some juris-
dictions to balance the importance of the duty to the employer against
the degree of deliberation or intent required to commit a breach.75
Similarly, inordinate expense or delay to the employer resulting from
an otherwise inadvertent breach of duty has been relied on for an
inference of deliberate misconduct.7 6 Such dilutions of the key element
of misconduct violate basic legislative policy. This error, however, is
certainly not confined to cases involving company rules.7 For example,
in Michigan, the negligent loss of a driver's license, needed in the
claimant's employment, as a result of traffic tickets or accidents has
been interpreted as misconduct.78 Since even the most careful drivers
74. Reed v. Employment Security Comm'n, 364 Mich. 395, 398, 110 N.W.2d 907,
908 (1961).
75. Wickey v. Appeal Bd., 369 Mich. 487, 120 N.W.2d 181 (1963) (ship'sfireman who "missed the boat" through inadvertence and poor judgment and had
essential duties aboard ship held guilty of misconduct); Bell v. Appeal Bd., 359
Mich. 649, 103 N.W.2d 584 (1960). See Sherman Bertram, Inc. v. Department of
Emp., 202 Cal. App. 2d 733, 21 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1962).
76. France v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 205 Pa. Super. 505, 211 A.2d 85
(1965).
77. Sherman Bertram, Inc. v. Department of Emp., 202 Cal. App. 2d 733, 21
Cal. Rptr. 130 (1962).
78. Echols v. Employment Security Comm'n, 4 Mich. App. 173, 144 N.W.2d 666(1966) (loss of license due to "points" considered a voluntary quit without good
cause) ; Phillips v. Appeal Bd., 373 Mich. 210, 128 N.W.2d 527 (1964) (revocation
of taxi driver's license held to be misconduct in connection with his work). Other
states take a different view. See, e.g., Yellow Cab Co. v. Stewart, 111 So. 2d 142(La. Ct. App. 1959) (traffic accidents not misconduct).
[VOL. 17: p. 635
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have some tickets and accidents as a normal incident of such employ-
ment, it is difficult to comprehend how such occurrences can establish
a wanton or willful breach of duty, unless independent evidence estab-
lished the requisite degree of intent. The dilution of the element of
scienter is most obvious in states that recognize the doctrine of "con-
structive quitting," which infers an intention or willingness to leave
employment from more remote deliberate activity unconnected with
the job.
The disqualification on the basis that the employee was discharged
for the commission of a crime most forcefully illustrates this point
even if the doctrine of "constructive quitting" is not applied. The
criminal activity of an employee in connection with his job disqualifies
him from receiving benefits. 79  Proof of criminal activity related to
the job does not depend on a conviction, and a finding of criminal mis-
conduct may be reached without any legally competent evidence.80
But, at least in close cases, some courts have been reluctant to find
criminal misconduct.8" One state follows the outcome of criminal
proceedings in its unemployment determinations.82 Of course, alleged
criminal activity can result in disqualification even if it is unrelated
to the job. The very fact of incarceration following arrest or convic-
tion often causes loss of employment. Although no direct duty to the
employer has been violated, the duty to be on the job may be breached
as an incident to the arrest or conviction. While it is illogical to equate
the commission of a crime with a deliberate or conscious indifference
to employment, some courts have made this leap.83 In some cases,
79. Rivera v. Catherwood, 28 App. Div. 2d 1036, 283 N.Y.S.2d 676 (1967)(employees selling narcotics on employment premises and bookmaking during working
hours); Thorne v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 167 Pa. Super. 572, 76 A.2d 485(1950) (assault and battery on a superior). The New York statute disqualifies a
claimant for twelve months following conviction for a felony on the job, even if thejob was not his last employment. N.Y. LABOR LAW § 593(4) (McKinney 1965).
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.531(f) (Supp. 1971) disqualifies a claimant who loses hisjob by reason of absence from work as a result of a conviction and jail sentence unless
the sentence is for less than ten days, or the defendant is allowed "day parole."
Apparently, the crime is disqualifying even if it is unrelated to the job.
80. Rivera v. Catherwood, 28 App. Div. 2d 1036, 283 N.Y.S.2d 676 (1967).
See note 48 supra.
81. See, e.g., Berner v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 211 Pa. Super. 318, 236
A,2d 840 (1967).
82. UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-4-5(b) (2) (Supp. 1971) postpones the unemploy-
ment hearing until after the criminal proceedings are concluded.
83. In Sherman Bertram, Inc. v. Department of Emp., 202 Cal. App. 2d 733,
21 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1962), the court stated:
Here claimant's unemployment was the result of his own fault - his own
wilful and felonious act in leaving the scene of an accident in which he wasinvolved without complying with the provisions of section 20001 [formerly § 480]
of the Vehicle Code. To say that claimant's wilful criminal act was not his
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the facts of the crime may show such an indifference to or wanton
disregard for employment. But, in other cases the crime itself sug-
gests lack of deliberation from which to infer deliberate or conscious
indifference toward employment obligations. Leaving the scene of an
accident is certainly a crime, but it may lack the necessary degree of
intent for job-connected misconduct. Everyone who commits a crime
is at fault and may need to be punished for it. But the unemployment
insurance system is ill-suited and unintended for the task. Perhaps,
in this area, disqualification is imposed for reasons of public acceptance
and morality at the expense of legislative or social policy.84
A further erosion of misconduct principles has been achieved by
the widespread acceptance of the "constructive quit" doctrine. Volun-
tary conduct by an employee which he reasonably knows or should
know will precipitate loss of employment -is called "constructive quit-
ting.".. 5 In New York, under the rubric of "provocation of discharge,"
the concept has been extensively used. 86 Once the precipitating conduct
has been identified and considered as voluntary, the only remaining
issue concerns the nexus or foreseeability of the resulting discharge.
Obviously, the doctrine as applied dilutes the basic element of malice,
intent, or at the very least, conscious indifference to losing employment.
Secondly, the doctrine attempts to make misconduct unrelated to the
job a disqualification.8" Further, the role of a reviewing court in a
fault and was not the cause of his unemployment is pure sophistry. To reward
claimant in such circumstances by awarding him unemployment compensation is
to reward him for idleness caused by his wilful violation of the law - and
at the expense of his employer who had nothing whatever to do with it.
Id. at 736, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 132. See also Alexander v. Employment Security Comm'n,
4 Mich. App. 378, 144 N.W.2d 852 (1966).
84. Kempfer, supra note 4, at 150, 163-65. Of course, public indignation can
become the legislative will, as Michigan's history reveals. In two Michigan cases
benefits were awarded to claimants who had lost their jobs due to conviction and
confinement in jail for short periods. Sullivan v. Appeal Bd., 358 Mich. 338, 100
N.W.2d 713 (1960); Employment Security Comm'n v. Appeal Bd., 356 Mich. 665,
97 N.W.2d 784 (1959). The courts rejected the doctrine of constructive leaving
and found that the leaving was involuntary. The legislature then amended the
statute to bar payment of benefits to a claimant who lost his job due to incarceration
following a conviction unless the sentence was less than ten days or "day parole"
was granted. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.531(f) (Supp. 1971). See Alexander v.
Employment Security Comm'n, 4 Mich. App. 378, 144 N.W.2d 850 (1966).
85. Sherman Bertram, Inc. v. Department of Emp., 202 Cal. App. 2d 733, 21
Cal. Rptr. 130 (1960).
86. Fishbein v. Catherwood, 28 App. Div. 2d 1059, 283 N.Y.S.2d 837 (1967)(a false statement made to third party was construed as a "voluntary quit" by
"provoking" the discharge); Monahan v. Catherwood, 27 App. Div. 2d 781, 277
N.Y.S.2d 229 (1967) (truck driver who did not punch out at end of work, in violation
of company rule, "voluntarily" left his job without good cause by "provoking" his
discharge).
87. Reed v. Employment Security Comm'n, 364 Mich. 395, 110 N.W.2d 907
(1961). In Reed, an employee was discharged pursuant to a company rule which
prohibited wage garnishments twice within a nine month period. The Michigan
court held that the employee could not be denied unemployment compensation on
[VOL. 17 : p. 635
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case of "provocation of discharge" or "constructive quit" is less active
than in misconduct cases. 88 For these reasons, the doctrine has been
criticized:
Signing a settlement agreement under the circumstances in which
Paul A. Larson found himself does not equate with leaving work
voluntarily.
Likewise, it cannot be called "constructive" voluntary leaving.
The Supreme Court has consistently rejected "constructive dis-
qualification" and though the circumstances in those cases may
have been different, the theory was the same . . . .This holding
was echoed in Thomas v. Employment Security Commission ...
and amplified by the statement, "It is not the proper function of
the court to amend the statute to broaden or extend the disqualifi-
cations fixed, in plain language, by the legislature. Whether one
in claimant's situation ought to be disqualified is a question of
policy for the legislature, not a judicial question to be determined
by the court." '
The rejection of the "constructive quit" theory does not guarantee
either liberal application of the law or complete adherence to the
requirement of intent or willfulness of the misconduct. In one of the
leading Michigan cases 90 rejecting the notion of "constructive quit,"
denial of benefits was still upheld on the ground of misconduct. The
court found a willful or wanton disregard of duty because the employee
literally missed the boat which depended on him as its fireman. The
importance or materiality of the duty apparently gave rise to a pre-
sumption of willful misconduct because of the breach. On the whole,
however, rejection of the "constructive quit" doctrine promotes clearer
policy analysis of the disqualification issue.9
IV. CONCLUSION
In applying disqualifications for voluntary leaving and misconduct,
an effort is being made to find objective standards and proof in place
of the apparent ambiguity and subjective tests of present statutes. In
the process, courts and administrative agencies sometimes invent doc-
grounds of misconduct since under the applicable statute misconduct was expressly
limited to misconduct connected with the employee's work. Here, there was no such
connection.
88. Monahan v. Catherwood, 27 App. Div. 2d 781, 277 N.Y.S.2d 229 (1967).
89. Larson v. Employment Security Comm'n, 2 Mich. App. 540, 545-46, 140
N.W.2d 777, 780 (1966) (citations omitted) ("voluntary" signing of settlement
terminating employment did not constitute voluntary leaving and the "constructive
quit" doctrine was again rejected).
90. Wickey v. Appeal Bd., 369 Mich. 487, 120 N.W.2d 181 (1963).
91. Reed v. Employment Security Comm'n, 364 Mich. 395, 110 N.W.2d 907
(1961). See note 87 supra.
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trines, presumptions and rules which ignore or exceed the legislative
intent. The necessity for such inventiveness flows from the practical
difficulty of processing and deciding numerous claims promptly, and
from the dual role of the various administrative agencies to assist the
unemployed in a time of need, yet to protect a limited fund from in-
eligible claimants so that an employer's reserve account is not unfairly
charged. While the difficulty may not be desirable, it is one commonly
found in the area of administrative law. The solution lies not in greater
procedural formality, but rather in a return to the legislative intent
and in demanding a minimum quantum of competent evidence before
disallowing a claim. The main purpose of the legislative scheme, the
integrity of the system itself and fairness to the unsophisticated
claimant will thus be better served.
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